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This paper analyzes the welfare effects of the Italian social security system in an economy 
with uncertainty on wages, financial market returns and life expectancy. The introduction of a 
pension system reproducing the Italian statutory scheme turns out to decrease ex-ante 
individual welfare, unless restrictions are assumed on retirement behavior. Overall, risk 
insurance effects of social security play a minor role in determining welfare variations. The 
new Italian NDC pension system is shown to yield a slight ex-ante welfare improvement from 
a purely risk-insurance perspective. This relative gain stems from risk diversification across 
working-life wages in computing benefits. 
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2009. 1 Introduction
Economic and demographic trends over the last decades have induced the need to re-
form Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension programs and restore their nancial sustainability.
These issues raise some fundamental questions that have been widely investigated by the
economic literature: are there economic reasons that could still justify the existence of
PAYG pension systems? What are the eects we should expect to obtain from systemic
or marginal reforms? What is the \desirable" size of social security?
When considering the eects of scal reforms and the distribution of gains and losses
among generations, one useful tool of analysis is the generational accounting methodology,
rst introduced by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotliko (1991, pp. 55-110). It aims at
estimating variations in the generational accounts, i.e. lifetime net taxes, of every living
and future generation.
An important remark to the generational accounting literature is that it fails to con-
sider uncertainty in estimating welfare eects. Neglecting uncertainty leaves out a crucial
part of actual overall welfare variations. In particular, many recent studies (Campbell
and Nosbusch 2007, pp. 2251-2268; Gottardi and Kubler 2009; Krueger and Kubler 2006,
pp. 737-755) have emphasized the role played by social security in increasing individuals'
welfare. Social security systems, especially of PAYG type, have indeed been shown in the
literature to be capable of enhancing risk insurance in the presence of uncertainty (on
factor returns, demographic trends, future scal policy decisions, and so on), dating back
at least to contributions by Enders and Lapan (1982, pp. 647-658) and Merton (1983, pp.
325-358).
In general, risk insurance causes risk-averse individuals to enjoy some ex-ante welfare
improvement, due to a reduction in the variability of lifetime income (and thus consump-
tion) ows.
A rst form of insurance is provided against the well-known \longevity risk" (Barr
3and Diamond 2006, pp. 15-39). Moreover, every individual faces mortality risk during
lifetime, potentially causing them to die without having consumed all of their savings, thus
accidentally (in the absence of a bequest motive) leaving some resources not utilized, that
is clearly sub-optimal from an individual's perspective. In the absence of annuity markets
a social security system is likely to be welfare-increasing (Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and
Joines 1995, pp. 83-114), since it provides insurance against those risks by paying pension
benets to retirees in the form of annuities, in exchange for contributions they paid in
while working.1
PAYG social security systems may also oer risk insurance tools in the absence of other
markets as well. The literature has concentrated in particular on the inecient allocation
of risks among dierent generations. A Pareto ecient allocation of risks could be reached
if all generations could ex-ante trade with each other in contingent-claims markets  a la
Arrow-Debreu. This ecient allocation however cannot be reached in economies with
dierent generations overlapping through time, because individuals cannot trade in risk-
sharing with individuals of other generations who are not yet born (Ball and Mankiw 2001,
pp. 523-547). There is therefore room for government to introduce a (contingent) social
security system letting dierent generations share demographic and macroeconomic risks,
typically by providing pensioners with claims to labor income (Krueger and Kubler 2006,
pp. 737-755), or also workers with claims to physical capital. Social security is in fact an
additional asset yielding a return whose degree of correlation with returns on other assets
- notably on individual savings - crucially determines insurance of individuals through
diversication of risks.
All of the previous points suggest that analyzing the incidence of social security requires
uncertainty to be taken into account.
1Annuity markets are actually narrow in real economies, seemingly contradicting predictions
of the traditional life cycle model. The literature has traditionally identied possible explanations
for this \annuity puzzle", notably low yields on annuities (also due to costs related to adverse
selection) and the presence of a bequest motive (Friedman and Warshawsky 1990, pp. 135-54).
4Most of the analysis on the Italian pension system so far has been concerned with
changes in both individual transfers and social security nancial viability resulting from
pension reforms. In particular, some studies have estimated the impacts of reforms from
a generational accounting perspective (Cardarelli and Sartor 2000, pp. 501-557) and the
eects on social security nancial sustainability (Sartor 2001, pp. 83-111). Another strand
of the literature on Italian pension reforms has been concerned with impacts related to
intra-generational redistribution (Fonseca and Sopraseuth, 2005). No studies on the Italian
pension system have yet analyzed the potential policy-induced welfare changes resulting
from aggregate risk insurance, when uncertainty is taken into account in its dierent -
demographic and macroeconomic - dimensions.
This paper is aimed at investigating the Italian social security system in a setting where
individuals face both mortality risk and uncertainty on factor returns, i.e. aggregate wages
and nancial market yields. The focus is on the welfare enhancement potentially resulting
from risk insurance provided by social security under market incompleteness, notably in
the absence of contingent-claims markets ( a la Arrow-Debreu) and particularly of annuity
markets.
By applying the salient features of the Italian pension system to a model representing
the Italian economy, the paper rstly analyzes whether social security can actually improve
individual welfare in the presence of macroeconomic and demographic risks under market
incompleteness. The introduction of a social security system reproducing the statutory
Italian pension scheme and being allowed to run within-period decits turns out to decrease
ex-ante welfare of individuals in the model, unless individuals in the absence of social
security are assumed to retire at a relatively early age due to some exogenous reason
(e.g. some \shock" worsening their health conditions). If the social security budget is
constrained to balance in every period, the optimal size of both the old and the new
Italian pension regime turns out to be positive but close to zero, therefore considerably
5lower than the actual size of the Italian pension system.
Secondly, the paper performs a comparison between the \old" Italian pension system
and the \new" system introduced in the mid 1990s. From a purely risk-insurance per-
spective the new regime proves to slightly improve ex-ante welfare, plausibly due to its
capability of performing better risk diversication across all working-life wages in comput-
ing pension benets. This result is robust to dierent specications of the main parameters
in the model.
Overall, risk-insurance eects of social security do not seem to signicantly drive wel-
fare gains and losses, and appear instead to be largely outweighed in magnitude by other
components of the overall welfare variation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 illustrates
the policy experiments that are considered, and presents the main ndings. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Model
The model considers a discrete time setting (every period in the model corresponds to one
year in real life) representing a partial equilibrium economy where both wages and market
returns are completely determined by foreign markets.2
The economy is thus aected by two main sources of macroeconomic uncertainty, that
are only partially correlated: wages and market returns. The pre-tax income of every
individual in every period t is determined by a stochastic real average market return rt on
2Italy can be approximately regarded as a small open economy worldwide and, by further
approximation, in the European Union. The paper assumes that real nancial returns and wages
are determined by European capital and labor markets. This assumption is quite realistic as regards
interest rates. As for wages, although the European labor market is not integrated, the high-level
integration in the European markets of goods can be thought of as inuencing the determination
of Italian real wages through the prices of tradable goods, in the wake of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem.
6their savings (government bonds, corporate bonds, stocks) and by a stochastic real wage
wt earned during working life. After retirement, every individual receives a pension benet
that is linked to their wages during their working lives, according to a given benet rule.
The model also takes into account yearly average wage growth, both at the aggregate
level (growth rate of labor productivity g) and at the cohort-specic level (seniority wage
growth sw). Both growth rates are assumed to be constant and to enter the model as
exogenous deterministic trends that are applied to the underlying stochastic dynamics of
wages wt.
The economy is populated by dierent generations overlapping through time. For
each generation, a representative individual is considered. All representative individuals
are identical. Total population mass grows at a deterministic constant rate m from every
period to the next.
Representative individuals live in the economy from age 1 to at most T years. Individ-
uals aged t (with t = 1;:::;T) survive to age t+1 with a given (age-dependent) conditional
survival probability, and they are assumed to know all survival probabilities.3 Besides
macroeconomic risks on wages and market returns, a further source of uncertainty in the
model is thus represented by mortality risk.
Each representative individual ex-ante maximizes expected discounted lifetime utility
with respect to within-period consumption and within-period leisure. Maximization occurs
at (just before) the beginning of life, i.e. at time t = 0, prior to entering the economy and
thus before knowing the realized values of any stochastic variable aecting utility in the






where  in the above formula is the subjective time discount factor;  t is the conditional
survival probability from age t   1 to age t, with  1 = 1 and  T+1 = 0 ; ct and lt are
3Hereafter, where considering a single representative individual in the economy, both time
periods and the individual's age are denoted by t (with t = 1;:::;T).
7respectively consumption and leisure entering the utility function of agents at age t. The








 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption of dierent
years, 1
 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure,
and t represents the time-varying leisure preference parameter. The leisure preference
parameter is plausibly assumed to be increasing over time and inversely proportional to
survival probabilities ( t), according to the following formula:
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In every period t individuals are provided with a given time endowment  T, and choose
consumption ct and labor supply  T   lt.
Every individual works and receives a wage wt for each unit of time spent working,
i.e. a total wage wt( T  lt), at every age t (if alive), until they choose to retire at age tret.
While working, individuals pay in social security contributions at a rate h out of their
labor income. After retirement lt is equal to  T and retirees receive a pension benet pt at
every age t (if alive) until death at T.
The within-period budget constraint of a given individual at every age t, assuming the
world starts at time t = 1, would therefore read as follows:
At+1 = At(1+rt)+(1 h)wt(1+g)t 1(1+sw)t 1( T  lt) ct for t = 1;:::;tret  1
At+1 = At(1 + rt) + pt   ct for t = tret;:::;T
where At represents the beginning-of-period asset holdings of the individual aged t.
Agents are assumed to be borrowing constrained:
At  0 for t = 1;:::;T
8Furthermore the model assumes there is no bequest motive, thus individuals do not
leave any bequest in case they live until age T: AT+1 = 0.
In case the individual dies before reaching age T, his accumulated assets, i.e. accidental
bequests, are assumed to be destroyed and provide no utility to other individuals who are
still alive.4
Markets in the model are incomplete. In addition to individuals being borrowing con-
strained, two other main sources of market incompleteness are considered. Firstly, and
quite realistically, agents in the economy cannot insure against uncertainty by trading con-
tingent claims  a la Arrow-Debreu. Secondly, annuity markets are assumed to be missing.
This latter assumption reects the very small size of the current Italian annuity market
(Guazzarotti and Tommasino 2008).
It can be noticed that the absence (or the relatively small size) of annuity markets
in general, also implies in particular the absence of privately-provided annuities yielding
wage-based returns, that are instead typically publicly provided through social security
especially under (Pay-As-You-Go) Dened Benet pension systems.
Government is assumed to enter the model only through running an unfunded social
security system. The contribution rate h in the baseline model is exogenously determined
so as to match the statutory contribution rate in the Italian social security system. Where
optimality analysis is performed, the contribution rate is endogenously determined so as
to guarantee the within-period balance of social security budget.
4This assumption is made for the sake of simplication when performing numerical computa-
tions. It does not aect - per se - the main results of the paper regarding risk-insurance eects of
social security, since it only deals with the distribution of accidental bequests across individuals.
Alternative assumptions regarding accidental bequests may involve redistributing unintended be-
quests to all or some of the surviving generations according to some criteria, e.g. in a lump-sum
fashion or proportionally to wealth conditions of the survivors.
92.1 Calibration and Optimization Problem
In order to solve the optimization problem, the parameters of the model are assigned
specic values resulting from an appropriate calibration aiming to replicate stylized facts
of the Italian economy, notably lifetime labor and consumption paths of individuals. In
particular, the calibrated lifetime consumption path slightly increases in line with wage
growth during working life, and drops at retirement. The simulated consumption drop
at retirement under the old pension regime in the model lies between 7% and 8%, and is
comparable to the drop empirically measured for Italy (Miniaci, Monfardini and Weber
2003; Battistin et al. 2008) under the old regime (prior to the 1992 Amato reform and as
modied by the Amato reform).
The benchmark economy utilized in the calibration is the Italian economy under the
old pension system, i.e. the pension regime before the introduction of the 1992 reform
(the so-called Amato reform). Because the old pension regime has been uniquely or mostly
applied in Italy so far - even after reforms in the 1990s, due to a long transition period
set by law - it represents the most suitable regime to be considered when calibrating the
model to reproduce reality. While applying the main statutory features of the old regime,
the calibration utilizes a replacement rate lying within a range that reasonably includes
the actual replacement rate enjoyed at retirement by individuals in Italy under the old
system: according to OECD (2007) estimates, the actual average (net) replacement rate
was plausibly above 90%.5
The model specication resulting from the calibration constitutes the \baseline" model,
i.e. the reference setting for all simulations. The baseline model is characterized as follows.
Each representative individual - representing both males and females - is assumed to
5The Italian pension system in the past decades was particularly advantageous to pensioners,
so that the actual replacement rate under the old scenario was higher than the one statutorily
set. This situation was due to several favorable conditions generally enjoyed by retirees, such as
opportunities of early retirement (e.g. the so-called \baby pensions" to public sector employees)
and relatively high pension benets.
10enter the economy when 21 years old, corresponding to the rst lifetime period (t = 1) in
the model. This reects the real average entry age in the labor market in Italy.
Assets held by individuals at the beginning of their (economic) life are assumed to be
equal to zero: A1 = 0.
Agents live at most 80 years (T = 80), i.e. until they are actually 100 years old,
surviving from every period to the next with a certain (conditional) survival probability.
The sequence of conditional survival probabilities f tgT
t=1 is computed as the weighted
average of survival probabilities per cohort of Italian males and females in 2004, reported
by the yearly demographic balance of Istat (Italian National Institute of Statistics).6
In the baseline calibration, population mass in every period is equal to one, i.e. yearly
population growth rate is equal to zero: m = 0. This is in line with recent demographic
trends and with demographic projections for Italy. According to the Istat demographic
balance, the Italian population in the 1990-2004 period has experienced an average yearly
population growth rate equal to 0:15%. Istat demographic projections for the 2007-2051
period, under the so-called \central" scenario, forecast an average yearly population growth
rate close to zero, namely 0:1%.
Econometric analysis on Italian wages and market returns (see Appendix for details)
suggests that the processes underlying wages (wt) and market returns (rt) can be repre-
sented as follows:
wt = 38:7227 + 0:6451  wt 1 + ewt
where ewt is the error term, normally, identically and independently distributed with
mean zero and variance 2
w = 2:9932.
rt = 0:0656 + ert
where ert is the error term, normally, identically and independently distributed with
62004 is one of the last years as of which data are available, and is in line with most time spans
for data utilized in the calibration.
11mean zero and variance 2
r = 0:01798.
Wages in the model therefore follow an autoregressive process. Market returns are
instead estimated to consist of an i.i.d. random variable (ert), around a constant mean
value. The covariance between the error terms ewt and ert, denoted as wr, represents
the degree of correlation between the stochastic component of wages and market returns.
It is estimated as
wr = 0:0557
suggesting a slight positive correlation between wages and market returns.
The deterministic yearly growth rate of aggregate real wages is assumed to be zero:
g = 0. This is in line with the average yearly growth rate of real compensations per
employee in period 1990-2004, that was roughly zero: according to OECD (2008) data for
Italy, average growth rate of real compensations in 1990-2004 was approximately equal to
 0:04%.
The only source of deterministic wage variation through time is a cohort-specic com-
ponent tracking changes in wages due to career dynamics, namely to seniority-driven
(contractual) increases in wages. This is consistent with an aggregate growth of real wages
equal to zero, since seniority growth of real wages regards every single cohort, under the
assumption - made in the model - that contractual wage dynamics is constant through-
out generations. By approximation based on OECD (2008) and Bank of Italy (Rosolia
and Torrini 2007) data, the average yearly \seniority" growth rate in real wages is set at
sw = 2%.
Since m = 0 and g = 0, the overall yearly growth of the economy in the baseline
scenario is equal to zero. Moreover, seniority wage growth (sw) is assumed to remain
constant throughout generations. Consequently, no macroeconomic or demographic eects
inuence welfare levels of dierent generations under dierent pension systems through
time.
12This assumption of no economic growth through time, along with the partial equi-
librium assumption, provide an advantage when performing welfare analysis: instead of
considering several overlapping generations through time, the whole analysis throughout
the paper will focus on a \steady state" single representative individual under dierent
social security systems, without loss of generality in the results.










The values for the above parameters are such that the individuals' (simulated) optimal
economic decisions in the model well reproduce those observed in reality.7
In particular, the value assigned to  lies in the range between 0.5 and 1.5 that can
be considered as a \reasonable" range for the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (Battistin et al. 2008). The subjective time discount factor  is also in line
with values commonly utilized in the literature.
Social security in the model reproduces the main actual features of the dierent pension
systems in Italy. In case the contribution rate is exogenously xed, it is equalized to the
statutory average contribution rate on wages of employees under dierent Italian pension
regimes (as described below).
7The model would t reality quite well also in case preference parameters were assigned dierent
values around the calibrated values, lying in ranges utilized in the literature.
13Considering the calibrated model, the solution to the corresponding optimization prob-
lem for a representative individual entering the economy at age t = 1 is a sequence of
optimally chosen values for consumption (fc
tgT
t=1) and leisure (fl
tgT
t=1) maximizing the
individual's expected discounted lifetime utility (measured at time t = 0).8 The solution
is found by numerically simulating the calibrated model: each analysis in the paper is
carried out through running 10000 simulations.
3 Simulations and Findings
Simulations are run by applying to the model various social security schemes reproducing
dierent past and current pension regimes in Italy.
3.1 The Italian Pension System
The major Italian pension reforms considered in the model are the so-called Amato reform
(1992) and Dini reform (1995).
Before the introduction of the Amato reform (i.e. under the \pre-Amato", or \old"
regime) the Italian pension system was an unfunded dened benet system (PAYG-DB),
in which pension benets were based on wages earned in the last ve years of working
life (only on last year's wage for public sector employees). Individuals were allowed to
retire after 35 years of work and contribution to social security (20 years for public sector
employees), or alternatively when they were 60 years old (55 for females) with at least 15
years of contribution. Pension benets were computed by applying to the average wage
over the last ve working years a replacement rate equal to 2% for every year of work and
contribution. The maximum possible replacement rate was equal to 80% (corresponding
8When practically solving the optimization problem, in every period t consumption (ct) is
substituted with assets at the beginning of next period (At+1) as a choice variable, according to
the relation between ct and At+1 derived from the budget constraint.
14to 40 years of work) for individuals working 40 years or more. The pre-Amato contribution
rate was approximately equal to 24%.
The 1992 Amato reform basically tightened the rules of the pension system (\post-
Amato" or \pre-Dini" regime) through parametric variations, while keeping unchanged
its systemic, i.e structural, aspects. The Amato reform provided that pension benets
would be computed by applying the replacement rate (2% for every year of work and
contribution) to the average of all wages earned throughout the entire working life. The
contribution rate was set at 27%.
The 1995 Dini reform instead changed the Italian pension system (\post-Dini", or
\new" regime) to a greater extent, by turning it from DB into NDC (notional dened
contribution). In order to compute pension benets, Social Security contributions are
\notionally", i.e. ctitiously, capitalized at a rate that is linked to the growth rate of the
economy during working life, and the amount accumulated in this way at retirement is
turned into annuities through multiplying it by statutory annuity rates (so called \trans-
formation coecients"). Dini reform allowed individuals to choose their retirement age
from any age between 57 and 65 years (with a minimum required number of years of
contribution). Annuity rates vary according to the age at which an individual chooses to
retire (the higher the retirement age, the greater the annuity rate, and the greater the pen-
sion benet), and are periodically revised in order to account for changes in the (average)
life expectancy of population. Individuals under the post-Dini system may also choose to
retire later, i.e. after 65: in this case the annuity rate (transformation coecient) utilized
in the benet rule remains constant thereafter, and equal to the annuity rate applied in
case of retirement at 65. The contribution rate, currently in force, was set at 33%.
A transition period was set by law: whoever at the end of 1995 had contributed for
more than 18 years, is not aected by Dini reform; for whomever entered the labor market
after 1995, Dini reform fully applies; for those having contributed to social security for
15less than 18 years at the end of 1995, a mixed regime applies, with pension determined
pro-rata (proportionally to time spent contributing before and after 1995).9
The above described features of the Italian pension system are reproduced (slightly
simplied) in the model. Following the approach of Cardarelli and Sartor (2000, pp. 501-
557), comparisons across regimes in the paper are performed between the system before
the Amato reform (old regime) and after the Dini reform (new regime).
3.2 Main Findings and Discussion
As outlined in the previous Section, the baseline model is calibrated so as to reproduce
the main features of the benchmark Italian economy as closely as possible. From the
corresponding simulations it turns out that individuals in the model under the actual old
pension system choose to retire as soon as they are statutorily allowed to (i.e. after 35
years of work and contribution, corresponding to retirement at 56 real-life years) since
they enjoy a very high eective replacement rate, as it was actually the case in Italy under
the old regime.
When optimization is instead performed under the statutory features of the pre-Amato
system, individuals turn out to choose to retire at a later age than the minimum allowed
by the system: in the simulated model, it is optimal for individuals under the old system to
work for 40 years, corresponding to retirement at tret = 41 in the model, i.e. 61 (real-life)
years. After working for 40 years, the ceiling to the replacement rate (no longer increasing
after 40 years of contribution) seems to provide an incentive to retire.
Under the statutory post-Dini system, ex-ante optimization requires individuals to
choose to retire after working for 44 years, corresponding to retirement at tret = 45 in
9The last major reform introduced in Italy in 2004, the so-called Maroni reform, basically
preserved the post-Dini regime, but set a gradual increase in the minimum retirement age from 60
years in 2008 to 62 years in 2014 onwards. Moreover, the Maroni reform provided some incentives
for workers to invest their accrued severance pay into pension funds, on an individual voluntary
basis.
16the model, i.e. 65 (real-life) years. The statutory \ceiling" on benet computation (the
annuity rate no longer increases when retiring at any age later than 65) would plausibly
induce individuals to retire before being \penalized".
Finally, in case there is not a social security system individuals in the model turn out
to optimally choose to retire late in their lifetime, after 69 years of work, corresponding
to retirement at tret = 70 in the model, i.e. 90 (real-life) years.
3.2.1 Introduction of Unbalanced Social Security
A question to be tackled is whether and why the introduction of social security is ex-ante
welfare improving for individuals in the model. The answer to this question serves in
particular to investigate the magnitude of risk-insurance eects that are possibly brought
about by social security.
Due to the features of the calibrated model (partial equilibrium setting, and no growth
of the economy) all comparisons carried out in the paper consider one representative
individual, belonging to one \representative" generation, under dierent settings.
The analysis rstly focuses on the case where the social security budget is possibly
unbalanced in every period.
Simulations are run to compare the model's economic setting respectively in the ab-
sence and in the presence of a social security system. In the former scenario, individuals
do not contribute to social security and do not receive pension benets of any sort; in the
latter scenario, the pension system is modeled so as to reproduce the pre-Amato regime,
a quite standard PAYG DB system.
The analysis is performed in ex-ante terms at time zero before individuals enter the
economy, through a comparison between the ex-ante expected discounted lifetime utility
(i.e. between the value function at the beginning of life) under the two scenarios. The
comparison is performed in terms of \Compensating Variation" (CV), i.e. in terms of
17the amount of assets that should be given to the individual in a setting (e.g. with social
security) before the beginning of his life, in order to let him benet from the same level
of ex-ante expected discounted lifetime utility as he would enjoy in the other setting (e.g.
without social security). If the introduction of social security under uncertainty turns out
to decrease (increase) ex-ante utility level of individuals, then the Compensating Variation
to be given to the individual in the setting with social security, in order to let him enjoy
the same ex-ante utility level that he enjoyed without social security, is positive (negative).
After running simulations, the Compensating Variation (CVSS) to be given to the
individual passing from a setting with no social security to a setting with a (pre-Amato)
pension system turns out to be positive:
CVSS = 461:4
The positive sign means that the introduction of social security in the Italian simulated
setting decreases individual welfare.
The above value of the Compensating Variation approximately corresponds to the sum
of assets held by the representative individual in each of the rst four years of working
life in the absence of social security. Alternatively, the above value corresponds to roughly
three times as much as the amount of the pension benet received by a retiree in every
period.
The welfare variation can also be measured by the so-called consumption equivalent,
i.e. the percentage change in lifetime consumption that is needed to equalize ex-ante
utility levels under dierent settings. In this case, individuals in the presence of social
security should benet from an increase by 14:9% in lifetime consumption in order to
enjoy the same ex-ante welfare level they would enjoy in the absence of social security.10
10When comparing in the same way a setting without social security and a setting under a post-
Dini system, it turns out that CVSS = 657:4. This value is roughly equal to the sum of assets held
by the representative individual in each of the rst ve years of working life in the absence of social
security, or alternatively to more than four times as much as the amount of the pension benet
received by a retiree in every period. The corresponding consumption equivalent measure equals
an increase by 38:4% in lifetime consumption to be enjoyed by individuals under social security in
18This result is noteworthy in that it implies that the introduction of the statutory Italian
social security scheme would decrease individual welfare despite the relative generosity of
its (net) transfers.
The individual value functions (representing in every period the value of expected dis-
counted utility from that period onwards) under the two settings, i.e. the absence of social
security (\No SS") and the pre-Amato pension system (\Old regime"), are graphically re-
ported in Figure 1. The lifetime value function in the setting without social security lies
above the one in the setting with social security. This suggests that in the baseline sce-
nario the introduction of a social security system decreases ex-ante welfare of individuals,
measured as the value function at the beginning of life.
Figure 1: Value function, No social security vs Old regime
It is important to notice that when performing this comparison the underlying eco-
nomic setting is kept the same: the actual underlying realizations of wt and rt from time
order for them to obtain the same ex-ante welfare level as in the absence of social security.
19t = 1 to time t = T are the same, and all relevant parameters are kept constant, except
for social security being absent or present. The only institutional variation between the
two settings is represented by the introduction of a social security system, that makes
individuals adjust their optimal lifetime paths for asset accumulation and leisure.11
As Fehr and Kotliko (1997) show in a general equilibrium setting, a part of the total
policy-induced welfare variation is due to changes in individual behavior, i.e. in con-
sumption (or asset accumulation) and leisure choices, as a response to the policy change.
Therefore, in order to better evaluate the part of total ex-ante utility variation that is due
to risk-insurance eects of social security, dierences in individual behavior under dierent
policy scenarios should be taken into account and somehow \eliminated" from the overall
welfare eect.
A rst attempt to partly account for this may consider a scenario where individuals
are assumed to need to retire at t = 41 (i.e. 61 real-world age) both in the absence and in
the presence of social security (in the latter case it is also the optimal retirement age).12
In this case, the Compensating Variation to be given to the individual passing from a
setting with no social security to a setting with a (pre-Amato) pension system is:
CVSS =  22948:5
that is roughly equal in absolute value to ten times as much as the sum of assets held
by the representative individual in each of the rst 12 years of working life in the absence of
social security. The negative sign of the Compensating Variation suggests that an increase
in the ex-ante expected utility of individuals occurs after introducing a pension system ( a
la pre-Amato), in case individuals in the absence of social security are assumed to need
11In particular as regards retirement behavior, individuals in the absence of social security choose
to retire at tret = 70, whereas in the presence of a social security system  a la pre-Amato they choose
to retire at tret = 41, and at tret = 45 under a system  a la post-Dini.
12Individuals in the absence of social security are assumed to need to retire at a previous age e.g.
due to some exogenous reason, like worsening health conditions. This assumption may roughly
compensate for the paper not explicitly taking into account health conditions of individuals through
lifetime and particularly in the old age.
20to retire at a relatively early age (t = 41). Intuitively, in case individuals need to retire
at a certain age they are better o in the presence of a pension system allowing them to
substitute labor income with pension wealth in the old age (i.e. after they retire).
In order to totally take away all policy-induced changes in individual behavior, another
comparison is performed simulating a setting where, on the one hand, the representative
individual under the pre-Amato system is forced to choose the same lifetime assets and
leisure paths as those he would choose in the no-social security scenario 13; on the other
hand, the individual in the absence of social security is again assumed to need to retire
at the same age as the one he would choose under the pre-Amato pension system. While
preventing the individual from optimizing over choice variables under both settings, these
constraints make the ex-ante welfare change between the two settings only depend on
dierences in lifetime transfers (lifetime net taxes) and in risk-insurance eects.
Under these assumptions, the Compensating Variation (CVSSFixed) that should be
given to the individual passing from a setting with no social security (where retirement is
exogenously set at time t = 41) to a setting with a pre-Amato pension system (where assets
and leisure choices are kept xed at the same level as in the absence of social security)
turns out to be negative:
CVSSFixed =  66:4
The above value of CVSSFixed is slightly higher in absolute value than the amount of
assets held by the representative individual in the rst year of working life in the absence of
social security. Its negative sign implies a welfare gain from introducing social security.14
13The choice variables in the model's optimization problem are represented in every period t by
assets at the beginning of the subsequent period (At+1) and leisure (lt).
14An analogous comparison can be performed between a setting without social security (where
retirement is exogenously set at time t = 45) and a setting under a post-Dini system (where assets
and leisure choices are kept xed at the same level as in the absence of social security). In this
case, the resulting Compensating Variation to individuals in the presence of social security turns
out to be CVSSFixed =  60:3, that qualitatively conrms the result under the pre-Amato system.
This value of the Compensating Variation is slightly lower in absolute value than the amount of
assets held by the representative individual in the rst year of working life in the absence of social
security.
21Obtaining a negative value of CVSSFixed however cannot be straightforwardly in-
terpreted as suggesting that the introduction of social security brings about some risk-
insurance eect. There is also another remaining component of ex-ante utility variation,
that is due to the change in lifetime net taxes (transfers): this transfer component may
be the main determinant of the above result, especially in case the Italian social security
budget were to run within-period decits. Secondly, because individuals in the absence of
social security are penalized by being not allowed to optimize over retirement age.
Overall, risk-insurance eects of social security may be relatively small in magnitude
(particularly as compared to the transfer component of ex-ante utility variation), and may
not play a relevant role in driving ex-ante welfare gains and losses.
Regardless of the relative magnitude (possibly negligible) of the risk-insurance com-
ponent out of the overall welfare variation, why may risk-insurance eects - even of small
size - be brought about by social security in the analyzed statutory Italian setting? There
seem to be two possible sources of welfare improvement related to risk insurance. On the
one hand, the provision of annuities to retired individuals in the model prevents mortality
risk from making them leave unintended bequests. On the other hand, a pension system
 a la pre-Amato (as well as  a la post-Dini) where benets are based on past wages, poten-
tially provides retirees with a hedge against nancial market risk in the old age. Such a
pension system can provide ex-ante risk \diversication" between the wage-based pension
and nancial market returns earned on savings accumulated until retirement, since wages
and market returns in the model are estimated to be imperfectly correlated.
3.2.2 Introduction of Balanced Social Security
In the above analyzed statutory setting, both the old and the new system turn out to cause
within-period social security budget decits. Under the statutory pre-Amato system the
22simulated within-period social security decit 15 is equal to:
SSdeficitpre Amato = 1456:9
whereas the within-period social security decit under the statutory post-Dini system
turns out to be:
SSdeficitpost Dini = 349
The resulting decit under the pre-Amato regime is approximately equal to the sum
of assets held in each of the rst nine working years by the representative individual in
the economy, whereas the decit under the post-Dini regime roughly equals the sum of
assets held in each of the rst ve working years by the representative individual in the
economy.16
The analysis therefore moves on to investigating the case where the social security
budget is forced to balance in every period, i.e. not to run a decit nor a surplus.
Under this assumption, the understanding of whether the introduction of social security
into the Italian economy is potentially ex-ante welfare improving relates to conditions for
\optimality" of social security, i.e. institutional conditions under which both social security
budget balance and maximization of individuals' utility occur.
Policy parameters (i.e. replacement rate under the pre-Amato system and the annuity
rate under the post-Dini system) are assumed to vary so as to get social security budget
exactly balanced under both systems, for every given level of the contribution rate.17
The optimal size of the social security system is therefore represented by the value of the
contribution rate (denoted as h) which maximizes individuals' welfare (in ex-ante terms)
15In the model the simulated within-period decit (resulting on average across 10000 simulations)
is roughly constant at every time, therefore a single \representative" period is taken as reference.
16The budget gain under the new regime is in line with the literature on Italian pension reforms.
The simulated value of this gain (roughly 1100 in terms of reduced within-period decit) is ap-
proximately equal to the sum of assets held by the representative individual in each of the rst
eight working years under the old regime, or alternatively to ten times as much as the amount of
the pension benet received by the representative individual in every period of retirement under
the old system.
17That is to say, both replacement rate (under the old regime) and annuity rate (under the new
regime) are treated as functions of the contribution rate.
23while satisfying social security budget balance condition.
From simulations it turns out that the optimal size of the contribution rate (thus, of
social security) is positive although close to zero: h
pre Amato = h
post Dini = 0:001, i.e.
0:1% under both the pre-Amato and the post-Dini system.
This means optimality requiring that there is a small social security system. The
corresponding optimal retirement age under both systems turns out to be tret = 69, i.e.
89 years in real life.
This result is robust to dierent specications of the model. It still holds in case
survival probabilities are higher than in the baseline setting (including the case in which
there is no uncertainty on death, i.e.  (t) = 1 in every period t), as well as in case
preference parameters are allowed to vary within a broad range of reasonable values.
A second analysis is performed by keeping retirement age exogenously xed at a given
threshold. This assumption is meant to reect e.g. worsening health conditions of in-
dividuals (some health shock) forcing them to retire at a given age. When exogenously
setting the retirement age at t = 41 (61 real-world age), the optimal size of the social
security system turns out to be h
pre Amato = h
post Dini = 0:035, i.e. 3:5% under both the
pre-Amato and the post-Dini system.
When instead exogenously setting the retirement age at t = 45, 65 real-world age 18,
the optimal contribution rate turns out to be h
pre Amato = h
post Dini = 0:02, i.e. 2%
under both the pre-Amato and the post-Dini system.
The reason why both systems yield the same optimal contribution rate (and retirement
age, if endogenously determined) is that under optimality and budget-balance conditions
the pre-Amato and the post-Dini regime induce individuals to choose (almost) equal asset
18The 65 retirement age corresponds to the eligibility requirement to receive the so-called \old
age pension" (\pensione di vecchiaia"), set by the Amato reform at 65 for males (60 for females).
The \old age pension" is provided to those individuals who turn 65 (for males, 60 for females),
conditional on paying contribution for at least 20 years. Therefore 65 can be meant to represent a
sort of age threshold after which individuals in the \real world" nd it hard to continue working
due to their health conditions.
24and leisure paths over their lifetime, and yield equal pension benet levels.
The optimal dimension of social security is in all cases much lower than the actual
dimension of the real Italian statutory setting, where contribution rates are approximately
24% under the old regime and 33% under the new regime.19
Under budget balance restrictions positive transfer eects of statutory pension systems
are substantially reduced. Therefore the very low optimal size of the balanced pension
scheme seems to conrm the guessing of the previous subsection, namely that risk insur-
ance eects of social security are plausibly relatively small and do not considerably drive
welfare gains and losses.
3.2.3 Comparison between Dierent Regimes
After analyzing the introduction of social security in the Italian economic setting, a com-
parison is carried out between the two regimes considered in the paper, i.e. the pre-Amato
and the post-Dini regimes, that are at rst modeled according to their statutory features.
While being applied to the Italian institutional setting, this comparison is basically be-
tween a typical DB system and a notional DC system.
The comparison is performed by analyzing the eects of dierent pension systems on
the welfare of a given representative individual entering the economy at time t = 1.
The rst general result is that the pre-Amato regime is more benecial in welfare
terms than the post-Dini regime. The Compensating Variation (CVNew) from the old to
the new regime (namely, the amount of assets compensating individuals under the new
regime to let them enjoy an ex-ante expected lifetime utility level equal to that enjoyed
by individuals under the old regime) is indeed positive:
19It is worth stressing that the optimal size of social security turns out to increase as the expected
average return on nancial assets (rt) is exogenously assumed to decrease with respect to the
baseline case (where the average nancial return is roughly 6:6%). However even when considerably
decreasing nancial returns the optimal contribution rate increases only slightly and remains much
lower than the actual size of the real Italian statutory setting.
25CVNew = 364:8
The above value approximately amounts to the sum of assets held by the representative
individual in each of the rst four years of working life under the old pension system.20
Value functions through time conrm, under this rst comparison, the overall supe-
riority of the old regime in terms of expected lifetime utility, as it is shown in Figure 2.
The lifetime value function in the setting with the old pension system lies slightly above
the one in the setting with the new pension system.
Figure 2: Value function, Old regime vs New regime
However, the two regimes are subject to dierent statutory rules, implying dierent
lifetime transfers, namely dierent contributions and pension benet levels. Moreover, the
welfare comparison between the two systems is also misled by the fact that individuals
20Alternatively, the value of the Compensating Variation amounts to two and a half times the
amount of the pension benet received by the retired individual under the pre-Amato system. The
corresponding consumption equivalent measure equals an increase by 9:8% in lifetime consumption
to be enjoyed by individuals under the new regime in order for them to obtain the same ex-ante
welfare level as under the old regime.
26under the old regime in the model retire at an earlier age (after 40 years of work) than
individuals under the new regime (retiring after 44 years of work). A more accurate
comparison aiming at investigating the merely risk-insurance impacts of social security
requires those dierences across systems to be taken away.
Dierences in lifetime transfers can be eliminated through exogenously equalizing the
contribution rate and the ex-ante possible levels of pension benets across the two regimes.
The contribution rate under both systems is set at the pre-Amato level (h = 0:24). More-
over the post-Dini annuity rate is set at such a level that ensures its pension benets are
ex-ante equal in expected value to those provided under the pre-Amato scheme.21
When performing a comparison under such assumptions, it turns out that the Com-
pensating Variation is negative:
CVNew =  0:0304
The amount of the Compensating Variation is equal in absolute value to a small
fraction (0:08%) of the amount of assets accumulated in the rst period of life by the
representative individual. The negative sign means that the ex-ante expected lifetime
utility under the new regime is slightly greater than under the old regime. This result
is crucial in the analysis carried out in the paper, in that it suggests that the post-Dini
system, when all statutory dierences across systems are eliminated, is potentially ex-ante
welfare improving, and this improvement is due to its better risk diversication properties
with respect to the pre-Amato system.
This result is qualitatively robust to variations in the preference parameters of the
model, as well as to variations in those parameters that are mostly related to uncertainty
such as the correlation between wages and market returns, and the variances of wages and
market returns.
21The statutory annuity rate (\transformation coecient") for individuals retiring at 61 is equal
to 0.05334. In order to equalize the ex-ante possible values of pension benets, this coecient is
increased in the simulation to 0.0873.
27In particular, as the variance (i.e. the riskiness) of wages increases, the post-Dini
system turns out to become more benecial with respect to the pre-Amato system (the
Compensating Variation becomes slightly lower, thus higher in absolute value), thereby
conrming its better ex-ante risk-insurance properties stemming from diversication of
wage risks across all working life wages. The reference Compensating Variation under the
above assumptions is CVNew =  0:0304. In case the variance of the stochastic component
of wages is assumed to be twice as much as that in the baseline case, i.e. 2
w = 5:9864,
with all other parameters remaining unchanged, the resulting Compensating Variation
turns out to slightly decrease (increase in absolute value) and to equal CVNew =  0:0609.
When a still higher variance is assumed, being four times as much as that in the baseline
case, i.e. 2
w = 11:9728, the Compensating Variation further decreases and amounts to
CVNew =  0:1216.
The reason why the Compensating Variation ( 0:0304) resulting from the last com-
parison is solely due to the risk-insurance component of the overall utility variation is that
the other components are neutralized. Not only has the transfer component been elimi-
nated (through equalizing the contribution rate and the possible pension levels across the
two systems), but also the component due to changes in individual behavior has been neu-
tralized. Individuals under the two systems are equal, face the same realizations of wages
and rates of return in every period 22, and receive (or pay) the same lifetime transfers
in expected value: their simulated labor/leisure (notably, retirement) choices as well as
consumption/saving choices turn out to be the same (or dierent to a negligible extent)
across the two systems.23
The only non-zero utility-variation component is the one related to risk insurance,
22The comparison is focused on the welfare of a given representative individual under dier-
ent pension systems. The underlying macroeconomic setting remains therefore the same across
systems.
23The result in terms of Compensating Variation is indeed the same in case simulations are run
while exogenously keeping optimal choices (leisure and assets) under the old system xed under
the new system.
28resulting from a dierence in the ex-ante probabilities of dierent pension levels occurring.
This dierence is due to the benet computation rules under the two systems: while the
pre-Amato system provides benets based on only the last ve years of working life, the
post-Dini system provides pension benets based on all working life contributions (and
thus wages). Therefore the new regime ex-ante reduces the variance of pension benets
by causing higher probability of mean benet values occurring and lower probability of
tail values (low and high benets) occurring.24 Even in case the ex-ante possible levels
of pension benets, and thus their expected (mean) value, are made equal under the two
systems, risk-averse individuals enjoy a small ex-ante welfare gain resulting from reduced
variability of pension benets, given equalized level of the contribution rate and equal
endogenous choices on assets and leisure.
Consequently the Dini reform is potentially benecial to individuals from a purely
risk-insurance perspective. From such perspective, what mostly diers across systems is
the degree of ex-ante risk diversication over uncertain working-life wages, depending on
the number of yearly wages (contributions) entering the benet formula. The longer the
working period (wages or contributions) entering the pension benet formula, the lower
the variance of pension benets, namely the higher the wage risk diversication 25, and
thus the greater the ex-ante expected utility to risk-averse individuals.
Nevertheless, the welfare gain to individuals under the new system is quite small (i.e.
CV is very small in absolute value as compared to assets accumulated by individuals
in the model), meaning that risk-insurance properties dier only slightly under the pre-
24When equally grouping pension benets into three levels, under the simulated pre-Amato
system the ex-ante probability of a \low" pension benet occurring is 0.18715, of a \mean" pension
benet 0.6257, and of a \high" pension benet 0.18715, for every age at which the individual chooses
to retire. Under the post-Dini system with the individual retiring at tret = 45 (respectively, 41),
instead, the ex-ante probability of a \low" pension benet level occurring is 0.0199 (0.02415), of a
\mean" benet level 0.9602 (0.9517), and of a \high" pension benet level 0.0199 (0.02415).
25This eect crucially depends on wages being only partially auto-correlated through time, as
it seems to be the case in reality. If wages were exogenously assumed to be serially uncorrelated,
i.e. with auto-correlation falling to zero, the advantage from the post-Dini system would slightly
increase as the resulting Compensating Variation would become CVNew =  0:0307.
29Amato and the post-Dini regime. In particular, risk-insurance dierences across the two
systems are outweighed in magnitude by dierences in lifetime (net) transfers: CVNew in
the baseline scenario (364.8) is considerably larger than the absolute value of CVNew in
the \risk-insurance" analysis ( 0:0304).
In order to further delve into the previous points, a nal comparison can be made
between the post-Amato/pre-Dini system and the post-Dini system. If such a comparison
is performed, after eliminating all dierences causing dierent transfers under the two
systems 26, it turns out that the Compensating Variation (CVNewAmato) to individuals
passing from the post-Amato to the post-Dini system is equal to zero:
CVAmatoNew = 0
This means that, after accounting for all dierences in transfers, the post-Amato and
the post-Dini system do not dier as regards ex-ante risk-insurance properties, and both
regimes turn out to be slightly ex-ante welfare improving with respect to the old (pre-
Amato) regime. The reason is clearly that both the Amato and the Dini reform cause
an improved diversication of wage risks, by tying pension benets to all wages (or con-
tributions) earned during working life, whereas the pre-Amato system provides pension
benets based on a shorter series of wages.
4 Concluding Remarks
The paper has analyzed social security eects in a setting marked by uncertainty at the
individual level and at the aggregate macroeconomic level, with reference to the Italian
26Contribution rate and pension benet levels are exogenously kept equal under the post-Amato
system and the post-Dini system. The contribution rate under the post-Amato setting is thus set
at h = 0:33, and the replacement rate is set at 1:33 (instead of the statutory 0:8) in order to ex-ante
equalize pension benets levels. As in the previous comparison, the elimination of dierences in
lifetime transfers induces individuals to make the same (or negligibly dierent) consumption/saving
and leisure choices, so that no (or negligible) changes in individuals' behavior occur when shifting
from the post-Amato to the post-Dini system.
30economy. The analysis is carried out in a \steady state" scenario, and focuses on a
representative individual belonging to a given generation.
The investigation has been carried out starting with a preliminary analysis of impacts
brought about by the introduction of a PAYG social security system in the Italian economy.
In the statutory setting, allowing social security budget to run within-period decits,
the introduction of social security in the simulated Italian economy turns out to decrease
ex-ante individual welfare, despite relatively generous pension transfers. Only in case
individuals are exogenously assumed to retire at a relatively early age (e.g. due to some
\shock" worsening their health conditions), the introduction of social security turns out
to improve their welfare level.
In a setting where the social security budget is forced to balance in every period, the
optimal size of both the old and the new Italian pension system (expressed in terms of the
contribution rate) turns out to be positive, although quite small and considerably lower
than the actual statutory size.
The research has then investigated the impacts of dierent pension regimes introduced
in Italy, particularly by comparing the old DB system with the new NDC system. The
main result is that, after accounting for dierences in lifetime transfers, the new pension
system potentially brings about a slight ex-ante welfare improvement. This positive eect
is due to the better risk-insurance properties of the new regime, stemming from enhanced
risk diversication throughout working-life wages in determining pension benets.
Overall, risk-insurance eects brought about by the introduction of social security plau-
sibly play a minor role in determining total welfare variations, and are clearly outweighed
in magnitude by other components, notably by changes in lifetime transfers.
315 Appendix
5.1 Data and Methodology
Stochastic processes for real market returns and wages have been estimated by considering
available historical series for Italy over the period 1990-2004. The reason why a relatively
short time span is considered is that for period 1990-2004 almost all needed data are
available. In order to obtain better estimates from an econometric point of view, data
have been taken at a quarterly frequency, so as to work on 60 observations instead of 15.
As for data sources, data on wages have been found in the OECD (2008) data set,
with \Compensation per employee in total economy" being the OECD entry that has
been utilized, since it is a measure of gross wages in the overall economy (comprising both
public and private sector).
Average market returns are computed as the weighted average of historical returns
on three major nancial assets held by Italian households: government bonds, corporate
bonds issued by Italian banks, and stocks issued by Italian companies.
Returns on government bonds have been computed as the non-weighted average yield
on two main types of Italian government bonds, namely short-term bonds (BOT - Italian
T-bills) and medium-to-long-term bonds (BTP - Italian T-bonds). As for returns on BOTs
the source is the \Ministero dell'Economia" web site, providing BOT returns at issue. As
regards BTPs return, the Bank of Italy \Rendistato" yield is utilized, since it reects
the average market performance of BTPs traded on the Electronic Bond and Government
Securities Market (MOT) of the Italian Stock Exchange.
Returns on corporate bonds issued by banks constitute the great majority of all Italian
corporate bonds. Their return is reported by the Bank of Italy \Rendiob" yield, reecting
the average market performance of corporate bonds issued by banks and traded on the
Electronic Bond and Government Securities Market (MOT) of the Italian Stock Exchange.
32The \Rendiob" index is available only from the end of the 1980s to 2004.
As for stocks, shares of listed companies have been deemed as representative of shares
of all Italian companies. Average returns on stocks have been computed using the COMIT
Performance - Total Return index, which includes total returns (both prices and dividends)
of all shares listed on the Stock Electronic Market (MTA) of the Italian Stock Exchange.
All of the three above mentioned types of returns have then been weighted considering
the yearly portfolio composition of Italian households reported by the Bank of Italy (2007),
referring to the period 1995 through 2006. Weights are computed as percentages of \Italian
government bonds", \Italian corporate bonds issued by banks" and \shares issued by
residents" in a simplied portfolio held by Italian households, namely a portfolio made up
of only those three categories of securities. In the absence of data on portfolio composition
relative to the 1990-1994 period, weights for returns in those years have been assumed to
be the same as those in year 1995. Moreover, when considering observations at a quarterly
frequency, the yearly weights are assumed to be the same throughout all quarters of every
year.
The average yearly "seniority" wage growth rate sw has been computed as the dif-
ference between two terms: the approximate yearly average growth rate of real wages
earned by a specic cohort from 1976 to 2004 (Italian workers entering the labor market
in 1976 when 21=22 years old); minus the average yearly aggregate growth rate of wages
in Italy throughout the period 1976-2004. Computing this dierence is aimed at obtaining
a cohort-specic measure of "seniority" wage growth. This measure is then assumed to
stay constant through time, and through generations, in the model. Data on aggregate
wages have been collected from OECD (2008) data base; data on the wage dynamics of
the cohort that entered the labor market in 1976 have been deduced by a rough analysis
of data reported by Rosolia and Torrini (2007).
Data utilized to compute the aggregate growth rate (g) of real wages in Italy in dierent
33historical periods have been found in OECD (2008) data source.
Data on social security contribution rates (h) have been found at INPS (National
Institute of social security) web site. Estimates on the actual replacement rate under the
pre-Amato system are reported in OECD (2007).
All demographic data and projections are provided by the yearly demographic balance
of Istat (National Institute of Statistics) web site.
5.2 Optimization Problem and Simulation Procedure
The model solution is based on optimization following nite-horizon stochastic dynamic
programming. Since an analytical solution to the optimization problem can not be ob-
tained, simulations have been run in order to solve the problem numerically. These simu-
lations have been performed by utilizing a numerical simulation software program.
In order to take into account the fact that wages (w) and market returns (r) are
stochastic variables, a randomization has been performed by letting the software program
randomly draw 10000 values for wt and rt from their respective stationary distributions in
every period t. The reason why in every model period 10000 simulations are run is to obtain
simulated results that are not dependent on one single randomization. Consequently, 10000
optimal assets (thus consumption) and leisure paths have been obtained, as well as 10000
pension benet levels. The values of these variables reported in the paper have been
obtained by averaging out across the 10000 trials in every period.
Wages and market returns in the model have been discretized into three states (\low",
\mean" and \high") each, in order to numerically solve the optimization problem. Stochas-
tic processes for wages and nancial market returns (autoregressive and serially uncor-
related, respectively) have been approximated by Markov chains through the Tauchen
procedure (Tauchen 1986, pp. 177-181) so as to be discretized. This procedure yields
stationary transition matrices for both wages and market returns, representing the con-
34ditional probabilities of passing from one state in a given period t to another state in the
subsequent period t + 1.
Like wages, pension benets have been accordingly discretized into three possible states
(\low", \mean" and \high") in order to run simulations.
As above anticipated, in numerically solving the optimization problem the choice vari-
ables for the individual in every period t are represented by leisure (lt) and asset holdings
at the beginning of the next period (At+1).
The assets variable has been discretized into a grid of points representing dierent
values for asset holdings of individuals. The number of equally spaced grid points is 25,
with the minimum grid value for assets being 0 (individuals cannot borrow in the model
economy), and the maximum grid value being 300.
In most simulations within-period time endowment (  T) has been normalized to 2. This
normalization of the per-period time endowment to two units turns out to be useful in
calibrating the model for computational reasons. Within-period leisure in the model, lt,
has been discretized so as to take on nine possible grid values from zero to (mostly) two.
In the baseline calibrated model individuals choose to work approximately 1 unit of time
(enjoying 1 time unit of leisure) during working life, whereas they enjoy the whole time
endowment after retirement.
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